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 This paper has been written in the frame of the EU-funded project “DECOBA”, led by 
Fondazione Di Vittorio (Italy) and ran together with the following partner organisations: HIVA-
KU Leuven (Belgium), Fundacion 1° Mayo (Spain), IRES (France), WSI (Germany), Università 
La Sapienza (Italy) and the ETUC.  Its content is mainly based on positions and working 
documents of the ETUC, developed over the period 2015-2017 in the frame of the daily work 
on collective bargaining, wage policy and the European semester. To be soon published in 
Leonardi and Pedersini (eds.), Multi-employer bargaining under pressure. Decentralization 
trends in five European Countries, ETUI (forthcoming). 
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1. Introduction 
The question asked in the opening of the paragraph below – does the 
EU have competence on collective bargaining and wages? – is of 
fundamental importance for the trade union movement. The answer is 
more complex than how apparently may look and is the basis on which the 
European Trade Union Confederation (referred to below as ETUC) has 
developed its strategies to cope with the economic governance over the 
last few years. However, in order to fully understand the positions of the 
trade unions, it is necessary to go through a short recollection of what the 
semester is and how it works. Such recollection is contained in the second 
paragraph. This will allow the reader to frame the reaction of the ETUC and 
to get a proper reading of the two phases of its new approach. The strategy 
that is being implemented to counteract and (re-)balance the policies 
imposed via the semester and make the latter more social-oriented is 
addressed in the third paragraph of this chapter. The forth one will analyse 
the policies implemented over the recent years via the impact of the 
semester as well as the improvements and results reached by trade unions 
within this framework of action. Looking firstly at the picture of the whole 
EU, then closer at the five target countries of the “DECOBA” project 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain). The final paragraph will draw 
the conclusions by shedding light on the paradox of the Commission’s 
narrative, especially regarding collective bargaining and wages.. 
2. Does the European Union have competence on 
collective bargaining and wages?1  
The 2008 crisis made self-evident that, as from the adoption of the 
single currency, the economies of the European Member States were ever 
more interwoven. Growth would have spread from one country to another 
but so would have done any “imbalance” too. The Economic and Monetary 
Union needed more coordinated policies among the national levels, 
especially in the frame of the Euro Area. This assumption pushed the 
governments of the Member States to design a new form of coordinated 
exercise of the public power in the economic domain. In 2011, the 
European semester for the economic policy coordination (referred to below 
as the Semester) was formally introduced2.  
                                               
1 The description of how the European Semester works made in this paragraph is mainly 
based on Arrigo, Cilento, Limardo (2016). 
2 See Section I-A, Council Regulation 1466/97/EU of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, 
as amended by the Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the 
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The semester is an innovative decision-making process – half way in 
between the Community and the intergovernmental methods – through 
which the European Member States design their policies for the budgetary 
surveillance, fiscal consolation and economic coordination. In a nutshell, it 
aims at achieving and keeping together the following objectives in a single 
and consistent framework of action: deepening and completing the single 
market while maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions.  
Within the governance of the single currency, each Member State runs 
a stability or convergence programme3. These imply a transferral of a 
certain degree of sovereignty to the supranational level with a view on 
coordinating the economic and social policies as well as completing the 
single market. The particularity of the semester process is precisely a 
certain degree of sharing the decision-making among countries while doing 
each government accountable in front of all the other Member States. For 
this to happen, the semester goes through a complicated series of 
interwoven cycles and documents. For the sake of simplicity of this chapter, 
one can summarise them in four main steps: setting of broad social and 
economic guidelines for the year to come by the European Commission via 
the so-called “Autumn Package” (including the Annual Growth Survey 
which can be seen as the main document stating those priorities); 
analysing the financial and socio-economic situation of each Member State 
and identifying critical areas for reform needs, again, by the European 
Commission via the Country Reports; definition of reforms to be 
undertaken by the governments via the National Plans; and, finally, the 
adoption of recommendations by the European Council regarding the 
actions and reforms to be implemented by each government. 
Such a sharing of the decision-making is embodied in the final outputs 
of the semester: the country specific recommendations (referred below to 
as CSR). They are proposed by the European Commission on the basis of 
the “discrepancy” between the objectives commonly set out and the actions 
proposed by each government in the National Plans. The Council has then 
the power to endorse, drop or amend each of these draft CSR. Once 
adopted, the CSR are “politically binding”4. Nevertheless, when a country 
                                               
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies. The Regulation 1175/2011 is one of the legislative instruments of the 
so-called Six Pack’. 
3 All the countries of the European Union should indeed adopt the euro sooner or later, 
excluding Denmark and the UK – which is currently under negotiations for withdrawing from 
the European Union. For the time being, Greece is excluded from the semester process, being 
under a specific financial assistance programme. 
4 See for example: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/528767/IPOL_ATA(2014)5287
67_EN.pdf.  
4 KRISTIAN BONGELLI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 138/2017 
find itself in a situation of need, the CSR become weightier and the country 
feels more urged to implement them. On the other hand, very often, the 
CSR are welcomed by the government who saw them as the right occasion 
to undertake desired reforms while minimising the “political shock” as the 
guilt can be attributed to the usual “villain”: the European Union. 
From the previous few lines one can retain two elements which 
contribute to define the answer to the opening question: 
- The European Commission has a mandate for analysing, monitoring and 
proposing policies; 
- The decision-making power rests in the hands of the European Council 
(i.e. the national governments themselves). 
The reason behind such a game of roles is extremely simple. As said 
above, the semester is half way in between the community and 
intergovernmental methods as it presents some peculiarities: i) it has been 
created by international treaties, other than the treaties of the EU, which 
have not even been signed by all the Member States as the Euro Plus Pact 
and Fiscal Compact; ii) it makes use of the European Institutions – giving 
them new roles, other than those established by the Treaties – to put in 
place intergovernmental programmes. However, by doing so, the related 
domains (under which falls also collective bargaining and wages) are still 
a national competence but that has been put under a common umbrella 
with a view of reaching objectives commonly agreed.  
This brought us to answer the question kept in mind from the 
beginning. Does the European Institutions have competence on collective 
bargaining and wages? Yes, but just to a certain extent. As this has been 
granted by the agreement of the Member States since the very moment 
they signed off the treaties establishing the new economic governance. In 
this frame, collective bargaining systems and wages are indeed scrutinised 
as factors contributing to the economic performance of the Union. So, while 
the Commission is responsible for the analysis and the monitoring it 
performs5, the Council  is accountable for the recommendations issued. 
This system has been designed, of course, to avoid any further extension 
of the core competences of the European Union itself. So, at the very end 
of the day, the national governments still are to be considered responsible 
for the policies implemented in their own country6, even though those 
national competences have been – to a certain degree – shared with their 
peers7. 
                                               
5 This is by the way a political exercise itself as the benchmarks used as well as the evaluation 
of social and economic policies can be driven by a political or ideological thinking. 
6 Of course, together with the National Parliaments. 
7 A concrete example may be helpful for understanding such a dichotomy. Over the last few 
years, the Commission has been putting forward a CSR on the need for making the Austrian 
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However, acknowledging this, does not mean that the resulting 
interferences on collective bargaining and wages are acceptable or 
justified. These are areas traditionally reserved to the autonomy of social 
partners. Areas from which, traditionally, governments refrained from 
intervening. Only the autonomous negotiations between the social partners 
can guarantee a fair balance of the interests of businesses and workers. 
Nevertheless, as we are currently experiencing, the “institutional 
environment” conducive to collective bargaining may change. The 
governments or, better, the National Parliaments, in their capacity of 
legislators, can surely decide otherwise. It is then up to the trade unions 
to step up, mobilise and take actions to defend their fundamental 
prerogatives on collective bargaining and wages from this wave of state 
interventionism. This is the reason why the European trade union 
movement has decided to get more involved in talks with the Commission 
and governments within the frame of the Economic Governance. The aim 
is to influence its content and, by doing so, to better defend the workers’ 
interests. In a nutshell: influencing the decisions rather than simply 
reacting after they were already taken. 
3. From reacting to influencing: the trade unions’ 
response to the European semester for the economic 
policy coordination. 
The European Semester, and in particular the CSR, addresses many 
topics which falls within the core business of trade unions. The list indeed 
does not end with collective bargaining and wages. Other fields of concerns 
for the unions addressed through the years by the semester are those 
encompassed in the so-called structural reforms. Notably, employment and 
labour market, pensions, unemployment benefits and the welfare system 
in general. Last but not least, the budgetary and fiscal reforms which have 
negatively impacted the public expenditure – especially public services – 
and investment.  
In the first years after the crisis was started, the fight against the 
austerity measures was played mainly at national level. The situation 
remained unchanged when the semester was introduced. The trade unions 
indeed strongly opposed it.  Rightly, it was seen as a method for imposing 
austerity and cuts over those countries in a weaker position because of 
their debt crisis. Moreover, another peculiarity of the semester is its 
democratic deficit. Being an intergovernmental process, it cut out any 
                                               
pension systems sustainable on the long run, recommendation always endorsed by the 
Council. Nevertheless, so far, the Austrian government has opposed to this request 
considering it unjustified.  
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possible supranational democratic accountability of the decisions taken. 
The involvement of the European Parliament was (and still is) a mere (and 
late) formality rather than a real exercise of control. The same happened 
with the European social partners who were exclusively consulted in very 
formal fora where they could express their views without any capacity to 
influence the policies. Under these conditions, the trade unions were able 
just to merely react to and reject decisions which, most of the times, were 
already taken.  
Between 2013 and 2014 the ETUC started working in a more structured 
way on the semester dossier. An informal coordination was established in 
order to reach common positions with a view on preparing the 
consultations. In the meantime, in the frame of the ETUC Collective 
Bargaining and Wages Coordination Committee, a first “semester toolkit” 
was being developed with the aim of monitoring the impact of the semester 
on collective bargaining and wages in the EU countries and sharing 
information in a two-way flow: between the national unions and the 
secretariat on the one hand, and among affiliates themselves on the other 
hand. Although the feedbacks from the affiliates were usually between 15 
and 18 – i.e. approximately a half of the EU Member States – the toolkit 
proved to be a valuable source of pieces of information to perform a 
comparative analysis of the situation and so giving sound arguments to the 
ETUC documents for the consultations. The toolkit was based on three 
pillars: the monitoring of the involvement of trade unions in the semester 
at national level; the monitoring of the respect of fundamental trade union 
rights; and the trade union assessment of the CSR as well as of actions 
undertaken by the governments. All of these tools then resulted into three 
yearly documents.  
In late 2014 the European trade unions decided to change their 
approach. The decision was not that easy to take. Simply reacting to the 
different semester documents and rejecting the austerity measures did not 
deliver results for workers and citizens. At the same time, it did not even 
let unions stay on the safe side as, in many countries, criticism was raised 
claiming the trade unions had not been able to properly fulfil their role of 
opposing to austerity. The new strategy was to develop a stronger internal 
coordination and to establish a structured dialogue with the Commission, 
especially with the DG Employment. This second part could have exposed 
the trade union movement to the risk of being associated with the process, 
legitimising it by (partially) “healing” its democratic deficit with no 
guarantee of influencing it. However, after almost 6 years of crisis and 3 
of the new economic governance, it was high time to step up efforts and 
moving from reacting to influencing.  
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The ETUC launched a project for refining the tools developed in the 
previous toolkit and extending the areas of work. A more stable 
coordination across such areas of work was established and reinforced, 
including collective bargaining and wages, economics and taxation, 
employment and labour market, social protection, education and skills, 
migration, youth, gender and equal opportunities. Other fields may be 
added in the near future. In the meantime, each trade union organisation 
was asked to appoint a responsible for coordinating the inputs from the 
national unions to the ETUC, liaising with the Commission’s European 
Semester Officers based in that country and participating to the 
consultation meetings to take place with the Commission and Council 
committees in Brussels. So far (i.e. July 2017), the group counts 36 TUSLO 
(Trade Union Semester Liaison Officers) from 26 countries. Together with 
the ETUC secretariat, they are part of a structured dialogue with DG 
Employment. Consultations are held in advance of the drafting of the 
Annual Growth Survey and Country Reports. An ex post assessment 
meeting takes place also after the latter are released in order to raise 
critical priorities not taken into consideration.  
Three tools have been developed in the new toolkit (so-called “ETUC 
Semester Toolkit 2.0”). The first one concerns the definition of the trade 
union priorities for the whole EU to be addressed in the following semester 
cycle and to be submitted at the consultations on the AGS. The second one 
supports the TUSLO in compiling what one can call trade union country 
report. This aims at influencing the Commission’ Country Report. The third 
tool monitors the involvement of trade unions in the semester at national 
level at the milestones of each semester cycle by performing an extensive 
analysis of: i) format of the consultations; ii) relevance and timely 
disclosure of information; iii) appropriateness of interlocutors; and iv) 
consideration given to the trade union analysis and proposals. Eventually, 
at the end of each cycle, the secretariat, supported by the TUSLO, release 
an assessment of the CSR and the whole cycle to take stock of 
improvements and results delivered. The current project will come to an 
end in September 2017. A follow up to further strengthen this strategy has 
been already envisaged as some good results have been achieved through 
such an involvement8. 
However, one has to admit that, all of this work was possible also 
thanks to the political support provided by the “fresh start” brought in by 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, who committed to relaunch 
social dialogue. This was indeed extremely visible in the renewed approach 
of Commission officials, much keener to listen and discuss with the trade 
                                               
8 Please see the next paragraphs for an evaluation of the results produced. 
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unions about priorities and policies throughout the entire cycle with respect 
to the previous years. 
4. Collective bargaining and wages in the Semester over 
the years 2015-2017: business as usual9. 
4.1 A brief overview of the whole EU. 
The interest of the European semester for wages and collective 
bargaining has remained stable through the years. From 2011 to 2016 
(excluding 2013), CSR in these fields have varied between 11 and 14. In 
2017 they have been 14 once again which means they have covered more 
than one half of the EU Member States, considering that Greece is still 
under a financial assistance programme and the UK is in talks for leaving 
the EU. Looking at the recommendations focusing on the wage-formation 
mechanisms only – generally aimed to foster the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining – it is worth noting they have been respectively 11, 
11, 12 and 14 in the last four years (2014-2017)10. Nevertheless, some 
improvements have been recorded over the years this report is focused on. 
 
The 2015 Semester cycle 
At the end of the 2014-2015 cycle, the situation was anyhow slightly 
improving under many aspects. The Juncker’s Commission showed more 
flexibility on budget deficits and CSR were generally a bit more positive 
than in past years but this was not the case for collective bargaining and 
wages. In general, the Commission’s advice on pays was still based on the 
mantra that “wages are to evolve in line with productivity” but the way it 
was applying this key idea was imbalanced. 
Some Member States, affected by the problem of real wages 
systematically lagging behind productivity developments, did not receive 
any wage recommendation at all. One of the most striking examples was 
represented by Poland. As shown in the graph on the next page, from 1999 
to 2015, real wage growth in Poland had not been able to keep up with 
productivity developments by a stunning 40 percentage points (10 
percentage points considering the period 2008-2015 only). 
Recommendations to improve wage dynamics were also conspicuously 
missing for those Countries experiencing a growing number of working 
                                               
9 This paragraph is mainly based on previous ETUC documents. Some of them are publicly 
accessible on the ETUC website, while some others were developed for internal purposes and 
not available. The analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the CSR on wages has been 
performed by Ronald Janssen, then ETUC Chief Economist and currently at the OECD-TUAC. 
10 For a deeper comparative analysis of social-related CSR in qualitative and quantitative 
terms, please see S. Clauwert (2017). 
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poors or large low-paid segments as, for instance, Estonia and the UK. 
However, besides the Member States abovementioned, the key 
recommendation on wages and productivity was also disingenuous for 
many others, in particular, for Western European Euro Area Countries. 
Here, the Commission was suggesting that wages had outpaced 
productivity whereas, in reality, it was again the other way around. 
Nevertheless, the general policy was then recommending Member State 
after Member State, to compete against each other on the basis of 
squeezing wages and, by doing so, dangerously declaring – de facto – 
those economies with the lowest wage dynamics as the reference 
benchmark for all. Thus, turning a blind eye on the risks of a ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ policy and to the danger that this race to the bottom inevitably 
would have ended up in “lowflation” (very low inflation) or even deflation, 
either for the euro area as a whole and/or for individual countries. 
 
Trends in growth in average real wages and labour productivity in 
developed economies, 1999-201511 
 
Source: ETUC own calculation by Ronald Janssen, Matthieu Méaulle and Torsten Muller 
 
Furthermore, minimum wages were regarded as hampering economic 
growth due to their (presumed) bad impact on job creation and 
competitiveness. Beyond some of the “DECOBA” countries – of which we 
will talk about later on – such a view was expressed in the cases of 
                                               
11 This is calculation has been made in the frame of the ETUC campaign “Europe needs a Pay 
rise”. Wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average 
monthly real wage in 36 economies. The base year is set in 1999 for reason of data 
availability. Source: ILO Global Wage Database; ILO Global Employment Trends (GET). 
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Portugal, Slovenia and Bulgaria. This totally overlooked the related positive 
effects, ignoring research as well as experience that minimum wage, when 
introduced or raised, do not tend to destroy jobs. On the contrary, it fosters 
positive trends.  
In other words, after 7 years of economic crisis, austerity and falling 
or stagnating wages, the Commission was still recommending a policy 
based on either wage cuts or wage moderation when Europe desperately 
needed something else. This assumption was well underlined by the ETUC 
press release below:  
“The Commission continues to overlook the fact that wages in 23 
Member States are lagging behind productivity. The Commission fails to 
identify, or react to, the redistribution from wages to profits. Europe needs 
a wage rise for fairness and to increase demand, mainly by strengthening 
collective bargaining”12.   
At the same time, besides suggesting overall wage squeezes for entire 
economies, the Commission was also using the formulae of ‘wages in line 
with productivity’ to promote the fragmentation and decentralisation of 
collective bargaining and wage formation across individual sectors, 
individual firms, regions and skills.  Moreover, the autonomy of social 
partners in setting wages was at that time challenged also by the newly 
proposed “competitiveness boards” – without any prior consultation of 
trade unions. This bodies– creatively built upon the example of Belgium’s 
National Labour Council – were meant to advice social partners and so to 
narrow their margin of manoeuvre for negotiations. Reacting to the Five 
Presidents’ Report13, former ETUC General Secretary Bernadette Ségol 
stated: 
“There is no way trade unions would accept a body separate from the 
social partners giving advice on wage negotiation. (…) Wage setting is the 
role of autonomous social partners. What the European Commission (…) 
fails to mention is that the authority in Belgium is run by employers and 
trade unions – it is not a separate body handing down advice to social 
partners to follow”14. 
 
                                               
12 https://www.etuc.org/press/country-specific-recommendations-2015-eu-needs-increase-
wages#.WYSapVGrRdg  
13 The Five Presidents’ Report is a document setting the way forward for the European Union, 
drafted by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, in close cooperation with Council 
President Donald Tusk, Euro Group President Jeroen Dijsselbloem, European Central Bank 
President Mario Draghi and European Parliament President Martin Schulz. Published on 22 
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The 2016 Semester cycle 
At the beginning of the 2016 cycle, the European Commission 
promised a more social-oriented Semester, respecting the autonomy of the 
social partners. The Country Reports 2016 then provided for an in-depth 
investigation of the socio-economic situation in each single Member State. 
Moreover, as had been announced in the “Communication on Steps 
Forward Completing Economic and Monetary Union”15, the 2016 Country 
Reports also measured the social performances. The benchmarking 
technique was supposed to promote social convergence but the social 
targets were then biased. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that “best 
practices” in the field of collective bargaining and wage setting, were 
unilaterally selected by the European Commission. This went in detriment 
of the overall coherence of the analysis, generating paradoxes. For 
instance, the Estonian collective bargaining systems, featured by the 
highest level of decentralisation in the EU was considered the most 
efficient, while Croatia was considered inefficient because collective 
bargaining proved able to protect workers against less favourable working 
time arrangements provided by law. Once again, this was a sign of a 
persistent and ideological conviction that structured forms of collective 
bargaining slow down reforms rather than seeing them as a democratic 
and balanced way to co-regulate the labour market.  
Unfortunately – and despite some concrete improvement in the social 
field – the following Country Specific Recommendations did keep going in 
the same direction. That wave of CSR still proposed the same failed 
economic policies of previous years while prompting new state 
interferences on collective bargaining and wages throughout Europe. 
Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain received recommendations 
questioning the wage-setting systems and employment protection 
legislation. The biased reading of the centralised collective bargaining 
model proved to be hard-to-die. Eventually, in countries deviating from the 
Stability and Growth Pact rules, the Commission advances the traditional 
macroeconomic solutions which already had for long caused stagnation and 
severe social consequences. Even though the country reports had 
recognised that the weak recovery Countries were experiencing was mainly 
driven by private consumption, the CSR did not provide any strong support 
for the missing ingredient to relaunch the European economy that the ETUC 
had been claiming for years: a generalised upward wage dynamic to boost 
internal demand. Commenting of the draft CSR just released, the then-
Deputy General Secretary Veronica Nilsson made crystal clear the severe 
disappointment of trade unions: 
                                               
15 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-600-EN-F1-1.PDF.  
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“The ETUC is very concerned that the Commission is again interfering 
in the autonomy of the social partners and collective bargaining. It’s wrong 
to claim that the increase in minimum wage in Portugal would harm 
employment and competitiveness as it is wrong to claim that the minimum 
wage in France hampers employment. On the contrary, what Europe needs 
is an increase in minimum wages, wage increases through enhanced 
collective bargaining to boost growth and tackle inequality, and action to 
end precarious employment. The Commissioners repeated as usual the 
need for structural reforms of the labour market which in the past have led 
to less collective bargaining, lower wages and higher unemployment. 
Europe does not need more of the same tried, tested and failed policies”16. 
 
The 2017 Semester cycle 
The 2017 Semester cycle began with some positive novelties. In 
October 2016, for the first time ever, the Council’s Employment Committee 
(referred to below as EMCO) undertook a sort of multilateral surveillance 
exercise for monitoring the involvement of social partners in the semester 
at national level. National governments, Commission officials and 
representatives of trade union organisations and employers’ associations 
gathered to perform a peer review of the involvement practises in the 
member states. Irrespectively of the results, that event was one of the 
concrete evidence of the Juncker’ engagement to revamp the social 
dialogue.  
The AGS17 was issued in November, moving forward on this track. The 
ETUC expressed appreciation for the Commission’s emphasis on the key 
role that social dialogue can play in designing and implementing economic 
and social policies. Finally, the social partners were recognised as 
responsible macroeconomic actors once again. The Commission indeed 
acknowledged that social dialogue is crucial for well-functioning social 
market economies, as shown by the best performing Member States over 
the last period18. In particular, recalling the capacity of social partners to 
engage in such an exercise could be viewed as a base for implementing 
the capacity building activities for national social partners enshrined in the 
Quadripartite Declaration on a “New start for Social Dialogue” as well as a 
driver for implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights to come. 
To a certain extent, the AGS 2017 could be considered as a first step 
to partially mitigate and revert the policies implemented since 2008. 





18 European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2017, p. 11. 
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Partially because, despite some positive changes were appreciable and, 
generally, the priorities the AGS put forward were quite more balanced 
than in the past, the narrative was still anchored to a general framework 
in which the need for structural reforms, budgetary consolidation and 
attention on labour cost competitiveness were still prevailing on the social 
dimension. 
Collective bargaining and wages represent a clear example of this 
situation – depicted by the ETUC as ‘schizophrenic’. In this respect, the 
improvements were self-evident compared with the previous years but, 
looking at the global picture, there still were some causes for serious 
concern.  
The Commission indeed, probably for the first time ever since the 
crisis, affirmed that “too modest wage developments” can be 
counterproductive, leading to “weaker aggregate demand and growth”19. 
This time the mantra “aligning wages with productivity” was interpreted 
also in the direction leading to positive wage dynamics. In particular, it 
stated that wage-setting systems – beyond being able to better respond to 
productivity changes over the time – should ensure “real income 
increases”. Furthermore, the Commission highlighted that, when fixing the 
minimum wage, a new element should have been taken into consideration 
by governments and social partners: the impact on in-work poverty. 
These references reflected some of the ETUC top priorities outlined in 
the document “ETUC for Growth and Social Progress: Priorities for the 
Annual Growth Survey 2017”20 which represented also the basis of the 
upcoming ETUC Campaign “Europe needs a pay rise”21. The daily work 
engaging the ETUC staff and affiliates in structured talks with the 
Commission was finally delivering results. Some of the Commission policy 
priorities were – slowly – turning in the direction wished by the trade union 
movement. 
The then-Deputy General Secretary Veronica Nilsson hailed such a new 
orientation and expressed the appreciation of the ETUC and its affiliates for 
Commissioner Thyssen’s call for wage-setting to generate real income 
increases. She commented:  
                                               
19 Idem 
20 The document was adopted by the ETUC executive committee on 11 October 2016 and 
can be found here: 
https://www.etuc.org/system/files/eu_semester/file/161011_etuc_priorities_on_the_ags_2
017_en_adopted.pdf.  
21 For more information see the campaign website at: https://payrise.eu/.  
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“Wage rises are crucial in increasing internal demand. Without more 
money in workers’ pockets, Europe will be unable to achieve a sustainable 
recovery”22. 
However, many other ideological assumptions were there so to 
counterweight or limit the progress made. For instance, despite 
decentralisation of collective bargaining was not explicitly addressed, the 
abovementioned positive aspects were counterbalanced by stating the 
importance of having wage-formation systems which can ensure that 
differences in skills and economic performances across regions, sectors and 
companies are taken into account. Once again, an argument recalling a 
preference for fragmented systems of collective bargaining. All this in spite 
of the seriousness of the social situation which would have rather 
suggested to support or (re-)strengthen the sector collective negotiations 
at national level, the most powerful tool which could help quickly address 
the problem of income inequalities. Beside, at the same time, the 
Commission was also providing support to the state interventionism related 
to the reforms of the wage-formation systems23.  
Finally, regarding wages, the reference to wage developments that can 
bring to productivity erosion was strongly criticised by the ETUC and its 
affiliates. Indeed, as was proved several times, real wages have been 
lagging well behind productivity in all the European Countries for years 
and, taking into consideration the sharp fall of the wage share of the GDP 
on-going since the 80’s, the reasons of the trade unions’ disappointment 
and concern become self-evident. Once again, the European trade union 
movement, though recognising the improvements made, was forced to call 
for the Commission to step up efforts and take more concrete actions 
toward the so-called “social triple A Europe” 
 
The situation did not improve much with the 2017 Country Reports. 
The divergence of priorities and opinions between the two different hands 
drafting these documents – i.e. DG Ecfin and DG Employment – became 
even clearer than in the AGS 2017. But the more positive aspects was that 
it became self-evident that the DG Employment was gaining more room in 
all those documents and, by doing so, it was slowly rebalancing the 
European Semester, drawing a greater attention to the social dimension of 
the economy. Some of the priorities presented by the ETUC and the 
member organisations during the consultation meetings with the European 
Commission were taken into account. However, the necessary U-turn 
wished by the trade unions did not materialise. The Country Reports 
                                               
22 https://www.etuc.org/press/etuc-semester-package#.WbP-acirRdg.  
23 A fear that would have soon came true, for instance, in Belgium. At this regard, please see 
G. van Gyes and S. Vanderhercke in this book. 
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touched upon collective bargaining systems in nine countries. This was 
mainly because the issue was extensively addressed in previous years, and 
the Commission’s former position in favour of the decentralisation was to 
be considered still largely valid. As some example can prove24. In Estonia 
the collective bargaining system – considered in 2016 the EU most efficient 
as completely decentralised – just one year later was accused of promoting 
too rapid wage growth. Nevertheless, no mention was made regarding the 
possibility to develop sector negotiations which can help better manage 
wage dynamics. The same happened in Romania’s Country Report but for 
different reasons. The Member State was described as suffering from 
poverty and inequalities. Here, collective bargaining should have been 
considered as a factor of democracy building and enhancement of salaries 
and working conditions. However, the Commission just made a timid 
reference to the weakness of collective bargaining and social dialogue. In 
Cyprus, despite the clear demands put forward by the unions about 
restoring and respecting collective bargaining and extending collective 
agreements, the Commission interfered again in the wage-setting 
mechanism. And, more worryingly, in the democratic process as well. It 
claimed there was just limited progress on the binding mechanism 
restraining the growth rate of public employees’ compensation and 
expressed disappointment because the legislative proposal making this 
mechanism – introduced until 2018 in collective agreements – permanent 
had been “rejected by the House of Representatives"25.  
To a certain extent, the only “positive” exception to such a general 
picture was represented by the case of Lithuania. Here, the Commission 
recalled that both trade unions and employers had raised concerns over 
the labour code reform. On this basis, the EC then recognised that a more 
proactive involvement of the social partners themselves in the designing 
process would benefit the effectiveness of such a reform. After the pressure 
exerted by the ETUC on the demands of its Lithuanian affiliates, the 
Commission successfully persuaded the governments to reopen the talks 
with social partners and the new reform was approved, carrying some 
amendments proposed by the social partners themselves. 
Regarding wages, the narrative remained more or less the same. 
Despite the need to boost the domestic demand, pay rises were neither 
encouraged nor welcomed, excluding some few exceptions26 – where wage 
increases were considered acceptable and even desirable by the 
Commission, as in line the macroeconomic fundamentals. But, what was 
more concerning, was the misreading of the minimum wage rises, notably 
                                               
24 See the next paragraph for the cases of Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. 
25 See Cyprus’ 2017 Country Report. 
26 Germany (see the next paragraph) and the Netherlands. 
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in the Eastern Countries. The EC indeed kept insisting on the ideological 
assumption there are risks that higher minimum wages may affect job 
creation and so encourage informal work or misuse of self- employment. 
Whereas, as claimed by the ETUC, the utmost attention should be paid on 
the negative social consequences of low incomes. For instance, again, in 
Estonia – as EAKL had feared – the EC expressed concern because the 
minimum wage is “increasing fast, outpacing overall wage growth over 
recent years” since these “increases can have a significant impact on the 
wage bill in the poorest regions”. Although the minimum wage stood at 
around 38% of the average wage, among the lowest levels in the EU. This 
is not only unacceptable for the trade unions and workers but is also 
detrimental to the EU countries’ commitment to implement the UN 
Sustainable Development Goal #10 which pledges, by 2030, to 
“progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40% of 
the population at a rate higher than the national average”. The paradox is 
highly worrying. Especially under the political point of view. The same failed 
austerity policies which has refrained Europe from a quicker and fairer 
economic recovery and which are the core basis of the anti-European right 
wing populism rising all over the continent are still reaffirmed and advised 
in too many Member States.  
 
The following 2017 CSRs made some further but little steps forward in 
the direction asked for by trade unions but still were generally 
unsatisfactory. Once again, they were not yet pro-wage growth and failed 
to encourage collective bargaining.  
Wage growth was advised in a handful of countries in excessive surplus 
position like Germany and the Netherlands. That was of course positive, 
but showed that governments still see wages as a factor for a macro-
economic adjustment, while the ETUC sees wages as a driver for social 
justice and growth. In some countries, CSRs may finally be harmful for 
wage development due to the doubts raised on efficacy of wage formation 
in the public sector (Cyprus, Romania and Croatia), on the performance of 
statutory minimum wages across the economy (as in Portugal) or on labour 
cost trends (as in Finland and Estonia). It happens in countries in which 
purchasing power of wage earners has diminished and wages have 
underperformed productivity gains in recent decades.  
The reference to transparency in setting mechanisms of minimum 
wages in Bulgaria and Romania was welcome. Transparency in minimum 
wage setting appeared in several country reports but only two countries 
received a recommendation, though it represented a progress that 
recommendations to redesign minimum wage settings cited the need to 
involve social partners.  
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On collective bargaining, the improvement on the previous cycle was 
that this time the governments opted for substantial self-restraint from 
intervening on collective bargaining arrangements. But in countries like 
Spain, Romania and Portugal, CSRs (even without directly referring to it) 
could harm the autonomous deployment of industrial relations institutions.  
To sum up, one can say that, while the EU economy is recovering, 
collectively agreed wages are not reflecting the positive economic outlook. 
Reduced employment protections are one reason why collectively agreed 
wages are underperforming and inflation is on the rise again. Said that, it 
is crystal clear that 2017 CSRs have failed to capitalise on the potential for 
coordinated and multiemployer collective bargaining to boost internal 
demand on the one hand and to tackle inequality and to reinstate social 
justice on the other hand. 
If the ambitions of the EU were to achieve “structural reforms … to 
foster social justice, mitigate income inequalities and support convergence 
towards better outcomes” and that “social priorities and consequences 
[had to] be taken into account when designing and implementing the 
reform agenda”, the results of the 2017 cycle have been very modest and 
often very negative to workers. Changes are urgently needed to bring 
social progress on the forefront and become a driver for policies that can 
improve the quality of work and living conditions all over Europe. Positive 
wage dynamics enabling an upward wage convergence are necessary 
either for stimulating the European economy and for rebuilding a fairer 
society. The hope of the European trade union movement is that the 
European Pillar of Social Rights27 may contribute to better shaping the 
future Semester cycles. 
4.2 A closer look at the “DECOBA Countries”. 
So far, we have seen the general picture. In this paragraph the analysis 
will focus closely on the five countries that have been the target of this 
project: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In particular, we will 
see if and how the policies recommended by the European Commission in 
terms of collective bargaining and wage dynamics have evolved over the 
period of time in question.  
 
Belgium 
Belgium has been for a long while one of the Commission’s favourite 
targets when it comes to collective bargaining and wages. Its centralised 
system of sectoral negotiations has been considered as a threat for the 
                                               
27 The formal proclamation of the Pillar by the European governments is expected for the 
Gothenburg Social Summit on 17 October 2017. 
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country’s productivity. According to the Commission this would be very 
visible just looking at the differential in productivity and labour cost trends 
with neighbouring and partner countries, notably Germany.  
In the preamble of the 2015 CSR, the Commission states “there is a 
need to align wage growth more closely with productivity and to make 
wage setting more flexible so as to increase the economy’s potential for 
adjustment … closing the gap entirely will require additional action which 
hinges on reforms of the wage-setting system”. However, the CSR itself 
asked to deliver such a result “in consultation with the social partners and 
in accordance with national practices”.  
In 2016 the Commission expressed its intention to release fewer, 
shorter and more focused Country Specific Recommendations28. In the 
Belgian case, the result was that only a small part of the previous year’s 
measure was mentioned but it was enough to let the recipients understand 
it was still referring to the wage formation reform: “Ensure that wages can 
evolve in line with productivity”.  
In 2017 this kind of recommendation did not show up. Indeed, in this 
year Country Report for Belgium the Commission could celebrate the long-
awaited – or, better, long-recommended – reform of collective bargaining. 
After years of sustained attacks and despite the strong opposition of the 
Belgian unions29, the government imposed such a reform. The new wage 
setting framework has narrowed the room for negotiations of social 
partners and granted to the government the possibility to take corrective 
measures in order to fix detrimental cost-competitiveness developments.  
This happened despite that, according to ETUC own calculation made 
in the frame of the campaign “Europe needs a pay rise”30 as well as to 
those provided by the three Belgian trade union organisations (for the 
ETUC report on trade union inputs for Country Reports 201631), it is not 
correct affirming that wage growth would have outpaced productivity gains 
– neither in the long run, nor in short one. 
 
 
                                               
28 However, as many practitioners have affirmed, it is true that the number of 
recommendations has been reduced but they have become longer. Generally, by condensing 
more policy measures in each single recommendation. 
29 According to ETUC own calculation made in the frame of the campaign “Europe needs a pay 
rise” as well as to calculations provided by the three Belgian trade union organisations (it is 
not correct affirming that wage growth would have outpaced productivity gains – neither in 
the long run nor in short run.  
30 Please see the related website at https://payrise.eu/ 
31 Available here: 
https://www.etuc.org/system/files/eu_semester/file/etuc_report_on_trade_unions_inputs_f
or_country_reports_2016_en.pdf.  
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France  
France has experienced almost the same path than Belgium. The wage 
dynamics were assessed as producing negative effects on the country’s 
competitiveness, notably – again – compared to Germany and the wage 
moderation policy applied in 2015 was considered insufficient to 
compensate those trends. Also, both its collective bargaining system and 
SMIC32 have been questioned for years. In particular, the Commission 
considered its system of collective bargaining as inefficient due to its 
presumed rigidity which did not allow firm level collective bargaining to 
flourish. It then asked for a reform which would have permitted a wider 
use of derogations from the sector collective agreements.  
The 2015 CSR read as follows “Reform, in consultation with the social 
partners and in accordance with national practices, the wage-setting 
system to ensure that wages evolve in line with productivity. Ensure that 
minimum wage developments are consistent with the objectives of 
promoting employment and competitiveness”. One year later the CSR 
referring to the wage-setting reform disappear as the French government, 
at that time, was undertaking a reform meant to ease the derogations from 
sector collective bargaining. It will then be approved in the second half of 
the year. Some time later, the 2017 Country Report welcomes the adoption 
of the labour reform but recognises that its effects would depend on the 
use the social partners make of it. This marks a point for the trade unions. 
It clearly proves that the EC implicitly recognises what the ETUC has said 
several times: the social partners are best placed to decide autonomously 
the appropriate level of collective bargaining to use and what to negotiate 
at the different levels. Therefore, it is necessary that their autonomy be 
respected. 
In 2016, the recommendation on the SMIC is still there (“Ensure that 
the labour cost reductions are sustained and that minimum wage 
developments are consistent with job creation and competitiveness”) but, 
finally, it will be gone in 2017. The reason for this change is very likely that 
the French minimum wage – as also recognised in the same year Country 
Report itself – represents a tool which effectively tackles in-work poverty. 
It is indeed one of the very few which stands at the 60% of the national 
average wage. A benchmark often used also by the trade unions to identify 
a minimum living wage33.  
 
 
                                               
32 Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance, i.e. the French minimum wage.   
33 For instance, see the ETUC Resolution on low and minimum wages, available here: 
https://www.etuc.org/documents/etuc-resolution-common-strategy-low-and-minimum-
wages#.WcghvMirRdg.  
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Germany  
The German case is very interesting. Germany is the only country – of 
those analysed in the frame of this project – in which the Commission 
challenged its wage moderation policy repeatedly acknowledged the need 
to make wages increase faster than how much they were doing. This was 
particularly true because Germany’s wage moderation policy has played a 
role in the negative trends of competitiveness – in particular, in terms of 
labour costs – of the neighbouring countries  
In 2016, the Commission just limited to note that wages were rising 
less than expected according to the economic fundamentals but no 
recommendation was then issued. This was indeed coherent with a policy 
framework inspired by an economic model driven mainly by exports and so 
devoted to contain labour costs, i.e. wages The Country Report read as 
follows: “over the whole period (2000-2015), the growth rate of wages 
(both in nominal and real terms) undershot the euro area average” as 
shown by the following graph of the Commission. 
 
Nominal wages  
(average annual growth, %) 
Real wages 
 (average annual growth, %) 
  
 
Source: European Commission, Germany’s 
Country Reports 2016 
 
Source: European Commission, Germany’s 
Country Reports 2016 
 
 
However, in the same year, the general analysis highlighted also that 
the fragile recovery Europe was experiencing was mainly due to domestic 
factors, especially consumption and the rise of positive wage dynamics. So, 
in 2017, the wage narrative has suddenly changed– at least for Germany. 
The Country Report explicitly said that “the social partners do not appear 
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to be making full use of the existing scope for sustained wage increases”34. 
Moreover, with the analysis performed in the 2017 Country Reports, the 
Commission indirectly35 admitted also that the German wage moderation 
policy have been producing spill-over effects in the Euro Area over the last 
years. This was affecting particularly Belgium’s and France’s cost 
competitiveness – especially, in terms of labour costs. 
On the contrary, the German collective bargaining model has not been 
challenged over the period in question. The reasons can be very likely 
found in the features and trends affecting the German collective bargaining 
system and which have been deeply analysed by Schulten and Bispinck in 
this book.  
 
Italy 
The 2015 CSR demanded a reform for fostering the company-level 
negotiation, by recommending to “establish, in consultation with the social 
partners and in accordance with national practices, an effective framework 
for second-level contractual bargaining”36.  
One year later, Italy’s Country Report kept stressing that the Italian 
collective bargaining system was still inefficient as not providing enough 
room for firm negotiations (and use of derogations from sector collective 
agreements). Nevertheless, the consequent waves of CSR did not address 
collective bargaining. The reform remains a highly sensitive open issue and 
is mentioned in the preamble but the reference to the role of social partners 
did not encourage a unilateral intervention from the government. This 
happened thanks to the platform for an autonomous reform of collective 
bargaining and industrial relations put forward by CGIL, CISL and UIL – 
three main Italian trade union confederations. Such a proposal already was 
signed off by some employers’ organisation and was under discussion with 
Confindustria and the government itself.  
In Italy, the outstanding reform of the collective bargaining system is 
not the object of a specific recommendation, but is mentioned in the 
preamble. Appearing in recommendations in the past year, this reform. 
The Italian trade union confederations have proposed a reform of the 
collective bargaining system which is now under discussion with some 
groups of employers. The preamble mentions the need to move on with 
                                               
34 European Commission, Germany’s Country report 2017, p.5 
35 Indirectly because this is what can be retained by reading in between the lines of Belgium’s 
and France’s Country Reports. 
36 As explained in the chapter about Italy in this book, a law enabling firm and local level 
collective bargaining was already in place in Italy since 2011 (i.e. Law 148/2011, Art.8) but 
the social partners agreed not to make use of as this was a reform imposed by the 
government. 
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the consensus of the social partners and it improves on the National Reform 
Programme in which the government was envisaging a unilateral 
intervention. 
In 2017 Country Report, the Commission complained because the 
inter-confederal agreement on trade union representativeness and 
collective bargaining was not yet operational. It also stressed that – despite 
the fiscal incentives granted by the central government, notably in terms 
of tax reductions for occupational welfare – firm bargaining was still not 
picking up. This translated into a recommendation requiring to “strengthen 
the collective bargaining framework to allow collective agreements to 
better take into account local conditions”, with the involvement of social 
partners themselves.  
The wording is slightly changed and the role of social partners is 
acknowledged. However, the Commission keeps promoting the state 
interventionism and interferences in a domain which should be reserved to 
the autonomy of social partners. This interference is intended to promote 
a reform the collective bargaining system toward the decentralisation, 
without taking into account the position of the social partners, and 
especially of the trade unions.  
 
Spain 
In 2015 the Commission recommended the Spanish government to 
promote the alignment of wages and productivity. Again, in other words, it 
suggested to foster decentralised collective bargaining.  
Despite the acknowledgment of the extremely worrying social 
situation, the 2016 Country Report kept insisting on this. The Spanish 
collective bargaining model was still considered inefficient because too rigid 
– as happened for Belgium, France and Italy. While wages were considered 
moving in line with the country’s economic performances. They were 
indeed rising, but less than they could have done compared to the GDP 
and productivity growth. This led to no recommendation related to the 
mantra of aligning wages to productivity in the following round of CSR.  
The recommendation related to the wage formation did no longer 
appear in 2016 and 2017. Whereas, in 2017 Country Reports, the 
Commission has addressed again the issue and expressed disappointment 
because the firm level negotiations were not picking up despite the recent 
reform. However, this did not take into due consideration the capacity of 
unilateral modifications in terms of pays and working time granted to the 
employers. As the Spanish colleagues denounced, this was mainly due to 
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the fact that these unilateral modifications are not subject to registration 
by the labour authority37. 
5. Conclusions. 
After having examined the European Semester cycles from 2015 to 
2017, it is now time to draw some conclusions of the analysis made. The 
positive change in the Commission’s narrative and the greater attention 
paid to the social dimension of the economy and the involvement of social 
partners in the process of decision-making – at least at EU level – cannot 
be denied38. This is clearly the result of the strong commitment of President 
Junker toward the recovery of the original values of the European social 
model. Nevertheless, the road ahead toward a “triple A Social Europe” is 
still well long. A self-evident example of the disillusionment of trade unions 
is represented by the Spanish case. The ETUC and its Spanish member 
organisations had welcomed the analysis – performed in the Country 
Reports – of the negative impact of high rates of precariousness in the 
labour market but this did not translate in an appropriate response when 
it came to issue the recommendations. Here, measures to “promote hiring 
on open-ended contracts” imply the removal of “uncertainty in case of legal 
dispute following a dismissal, along with comparatively high severance 
payments for workers on permanent contracts” 39.   
The European trade union movement has expressed appreciation for 
the efforts put in place by the Commission several time. They are strongly 
committed and supportive with regards to the social initiatives that will be 
further developed in the forthcoming months – notably, the European Pillar 
of Social Rights. However, one has to stress that the result in terms of 
reverting those social and economic policies which have produced 
resentment and anti-European feelings among EU citizens are still too poor.  
This is even more true when it comes to collective bargaining and 
wages, particularly when looking at the five countries analysed in the 
current project. Here, one can easily see how the semester has insisted on 
reforming the wage formation systems by fostering the trend toward 
decentralisation. Germany did not receive such kind of recommendations 
over the period in question as its system was already affected by 
decentralisation and fragmentation. Italy is the only country where national 
sector bargaining is still under attack as in Belgium, France and Spain, the 
Commission dropped off the related recommendations only once the 
reforms imposed were implemented. However, in these four countries it is 
                                               
37 For a deeper analysis of this worrying problem, see Rocha in this book. 
38 This is the case, for instance, of those recommendations aiming at fighting undeclared work 
in Portugal and Romania. 
39 Spain’s Country Specific Recommendations 2017 
24 KRISTIAN BONGELLI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 138/2017 
still complaining because firm bargaining is surprisingly not taking off. In 
reality, this happens for a specific reason as the unions have always been 
explaining. Indeed, in economies dominated by small and medium-sized 
enterprises, decentralisation of collective bargaining to make it more 
responsive to quickly changing business needs is an ideological argument. 
SMEs have rarely the capacity and skills to negotiate collective agreements. 
Company bargaining represents then a cost and an impediment for this 
kind of businesses40. On the contrary, sector collective bargaining 
embodies a tool for setting level conditions and preventing unfair 
competition. Moreover, the Commission has also admitted that social 
partners make a poor use of derogations even when they would be allowed 
to. As stated by the ETUC in many occasions, this is not weird. Social 
partners are indeed the best placed to decide on what to negotiate and at 
which level. This is the reason why institutions should stop any unwanted 
interference in the autonomy of social partners.  
In addition, it is worthy stressing the incoherence between the 
Commission’s analysis and consequent recommended policies. In countries 
with outstanding problems of income inequality, national sector 
negotiations are the most efficient instrument for a rapid redistribution of 
wealth produced in the whole society. Especially, after more than 30 years 
of constant wage share decrease as shown by the graph below. 
 
Changes in the wage share in Europe (1960-2016) 
 
Source: database AMECO 
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This situation is particularly concerning in countries which have been 
under the Troika programmes (Ireland, Spain, Portugal) and in many 
Central Eastern European but affects also western countries member of the 
Euro Area (Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands), as can be 
seen by the breakdown graph below.  
 
Declining labour shares in the EU 1995-2014 (in percentage 
points)41 
 
Source: OECD ECO Working Paper 2017/5 
 
 
Another paradox in the Commission’s narrative is that of predictability 
of wage dynamics. As previously noted, one year the EC considers the 
Estonian bargaining system the most efficient as totally decentralised. 
Some months later it complains that negotiated pay rises are not 
responsive to productivity and economic performances. Again, sector 
collective bargaining is an example of how unions and businesses can be 
responsible macroeconomic actors. This testify once again that strong 
social partners are an added value for the economy and society as a whole. 
Someone may argue that, if unions and/or employers’ organisations 
are weak or not representative to negotiate wage increases and to conclude 
binding collective agreements, this is not the fault of the European 
                                               
41 R. Janssen, Why pay rises are a plus for the economy, academic paper developed for the 
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Commission, nor of the governments. This is not completely true. 
Collective bargaining, and social dialogue in general, needs a supportive 
framework – either legal or institutional – enabling social partners’ 
negotiations. Something which is of course in place in those Member States 
with strong industrial relations traditions and which is missing or has been 
dismantled due to recent reforms in many others. As well explained by 
ETUC General Secretary Luca Visentini – in his speech given at the 
conference ‘End Corporate Greed. Europe - and the world – needs a pay 
rise’ – “without such frameworks, we will never be able to address the gap 
in wages and working conditions between Western and Eastern Europe, nor 
social dumping”. Thus, the ETUC, via its pay rise campaign, is spreading 
the key message that Europe needs wage increases achieved through 
collective bargaining, notably national sector negotiations. 
For too long policy makers have been overlooking the vital functions 
of collective bargaining, especially at national sectoral level. The European 
Pillar of Social Rights is an unprecedented occasion to finally revert this 
trend and create an upward convergence across EU Member States. In the 
20 principles put forward by the Commission there is a clear indication of 
the role the social partners may (and have) to play for its effective 
implementation via social dialogue and collective bargaining. The 
Commission promised that the 2018 cycle will be the first round of the new 
“social semester”, intended to start implementing such 20 principles. 
Hopefully, this will not remain just void words on paper. Europe may not 
have many further chances to progress toward and remain faithful to the 
key objective of the European integration project: prosperity for all. 
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